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I. REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. PARTIES 
Deep Quod Riverwatcher (Riverwatcher) is a not for profit 
environmental organization under the laws of the State of New 
Union. Riverwatcher is fully funded through membership dues 
and charitable contributions. Its mission is to keep the Deep 
Quod River and its tributaries protected from pollution and to 
advocate for clean waterways. The Deep Quod River is itself 
navigable and connects to the Mississippi River, which is used for 
commercial navigation. Members use the Deep Quod River for 
navigation, various recreational activities, and aesthetic 
enjoyment. Dean James is one such member of the Riverwatcher 
organization that uses the Deep Quod River for recreation and 
navigation. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
the federal agency responsible for enforcing and administering 
select environmental laws and regulations. Their mission is to 
protect human health and the environment from significant risk 
1
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of harm. The State of New Union is subject to the administration 
of environmental laws and regulations by EPA and through their 
own state agencies. The State of New Union Department of 
Agriculture (DOA) is one such state agency, and is also the 
agency that has issued the classification for Moon Moo Farm. 
Moon Moo Farm is a dairy farm in the State of New Union, 
just outside the City of Farmville. The facility has 350 head of 
milk cows, which are housed in a barn on the property. The cows 
are not pastured at any time of the year. The DOA has designated 
Moon Moo Farm as a no discharge animal feeding operation 
(AFO). The classification means that there is not normally a 
direct discharge from the facility into waters during a typical 25 
year storm cycle. As a no discharge AFO, Moon Moo Farm must 
submit a nutrient management plan (NMP) to the DOA that 
describes application rates and expected nutrient uptakes levels. 
B. APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
  Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 
301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012) 
  Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) 
  Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012) 
  Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) 
  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 4005, 42 U.S.C. 
6945 (2012) 
  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6972 (2012) 
  Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 
122.23 (2014) 
  Definition of Solid Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2014) 
  Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities and 
Practices – Scope and Purpose, 40 C.F.R. § 257.1 (2014) 
  Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Disposal 
Facilities and Practices: 
  Floodplains, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-1 (2014) 
  Ground Water, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4 (2014) 
  Application to Land Used for the Production of Food Chain 
Crops, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-5 (2014) 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2
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C. SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The undisputed facts established by the district court are as 
follows: 
Moon Moo Farm is the operator of a dairy farm located ten 
miles from the City of Farmville in the State of New Union. The 
farm consists of 350 milk cows, which are housed in a barn and 
not pastured. In 2010, Moon Moo Farm expanded to the current 
350 cows from its previous 170 cows, due to the need to serve a 
growing demand for milk by the Chokos Greek Yogurt facility. In 
2012, Moon Moo Farm began accepting acid whey produced by 
the Chokos facility. The manure and other liquid waste from the 
cows is collected through an interconnected series of drains and 
pipes that run from the barn to an outdoor lagoon. The acid whey 
taken from the Chokos facility is added to the lagoon to create a 
manure mixture, which is stored in the lagoon to be later used as 
fertilizer. Per the design of the lagoon, the mixture should be fully 
contained within it during any normal 25 year rainfall event. 
Periodically, the manure mixture from the lagoon is pumped into 
tank trailers, then hauled by tractor and spread on the Bermuda 
grass fields that are also owned by Moon Moo Farm. Each 
summer the Bermuda grass is dried and harvested as silage. 
The Moon Moo Farm property, including its Bermuda grass 
fields, is located at a bend in the course of the Deep Quod River. 
Prior to Moon Moo Farm’s ownership of the property, a bypass 
canal, now known as the Queechunk Canal, was excavated in 
order to alleviate flooding that occurred at the river bend. The 
Deep Quod River flows year round and runs into the Mississippi 
River, which is a navigable in fact body of water that has long 
been used for commercial navigation. However, most of the flow 
of the Deep Quod River in the area near Moon Moo Farm is 
diverted into the fifty yard wide and three to four feet deep 
Queechunk Canal. The Deep Quod River, as well as the 
Queechunk Canal, can be navigated by a canoe or small boat both 
upstream and downstream. In addition, the community of 
Farmville uses the Deep Quod River as a drinking water source 
downstream of Moon Moo Farm. Moon Moo Farm owns the land 
on both sides of the Queechunk Canal and has prominently 
posted “No Trespassing” signs although the canal, which is 
commonly used as a shortcut for the Deep Quod River. 
3
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Moon Moo Farm is currently regulated by the State of New 
Union as a “no discharge” animal feeding operation (AFO) and 
therefore does not hold any permit issued pursuant to the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
program. As a “no discharge” AFO, Moon Moo Farm does not 
normally have a direct discharge into waters of the State of New 
Union from its manure lagoon and handling facility during 
conditions up to and including a 25 year storm event. As a “no-
discharge” facility, Moon Moo Farm must submit a nutrient 
management plan (NMP) to the Farmville Regional Office of the 
State of New Union Department of Agriculture (DOA). Moon Moo 
Farm’s NMP sets forth all planned seasonal manure application 
rates and calculations of the expected uptake of nutrients by the 
Bermuda grass fields. Moon Moo Farm has records stating that at 
all times it has applied manure to its fields at rates consistent 
with its NMP. The DOA has the authority to reject an NMP found 
to be insufficient. However, they do not ordinarily review 
submitted NMPs, and there is no provision providing for public 
comment on submitted NMPs. 
During the late winter and early spring of 2013, Deep Quod 
Riverwatcher (Riverwatcher) received complaints of a manure 
smell and turbid brown color coming from the Deep Quod River. 
There was also a nitrate advisory issued for the drinking water 
coming from the Deep Quod River, warning people that the water 
was unsafe for drinking by infants due to high levels of nitrates. 
Customers were advised to give bottled water to infants less than 
two years old but that the nitrates did not pose any health threat 
to adults or juveniles over the age of two. Nitrate advisories have 
periodically been issued in Farmville in the past, before the 
increase in Moon Moo Farm’s cows, specifically in 2002, 2006, 
2007, 2009 and 2010. On April 12, 2013, in response to the 
complaints, Dean James, a member of Riverwatcher, made an 
investigatory patrol of the Deep Quod River on a small metal 
outboard or “jon boat.” James ignored the posted “No 
Trespassing” signs and proceeded up the Queechunk Canal. He 
observed and photographed the manure spreading operations on 
Moon Moo Farm’s fields as well as discolored brown water flowing 
from the fields through a drainage ditch into the Queechunk 
Canal. James took samples of the water flowing from the ditch 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2
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and had them tested. The results showed highly elevated levels of 
nitrates and fecal coliforms. 
Riverwatcher submitted the affidavit of Dr. Ella Mae, an 
agronomist whose stated opinion is that the lower pH of the 
liquid manure, a result of adding the acid whey from the Chokos 
facility, has lowered the pH of the soil in Moon Moo Farm’s fields. 
Through testing of the soil obtained during discovery, Dr. Mae 
determined that the pH level of the mixture was 6.1, a weak acid. 
Dr. Mae states that this level of acidity prevented the Bermuda 
grass from effectively taking in the nutrients from the manure 
mixture. These unprocessed nutrients were released into the 
environment, including the Deep Quod River, through leaching 
groundwater and runoff during rain events.  In addition, Dr. Mae 
states that the application of the manure mixture during a rain 
event is a poor management practice that will nearly always 
result in runoff of nutrients from the fields. Moon Moo Farm 
submitted an affidavit from Dr. Emmet Green, an agronomist 
who stated that he did not dispute the assertion that the acid 
whey reduced the pH level of the soil and nutrient uptake by the 
Bermuda grass. However, Dr. Green stated that Bermuda grass 
can tolerate a wide range of pH levels and that the application of 
whey as a soil conditioner was a longstanding practice in the 
State of New Union. Dr. Green also mentioned that there is 
nothing in Moon Moo Farm’s NMP that prevents it from applying 
the manure mixture during a rain event. Dr. Susan Generis, 
Riverwatcher’s environmental health expert, conceded at her 
deposition that although it was her opinion that Moon Moo 
Farm’s discharges contributed to the April 2013 nitrate advisory, 
it was impossible to state that the discharges were the “but for” 
cause of the advisory. 
Riverwatcher served Moon Moo Farm, the New Union 
Department of Environmental Quality and EPA with a notice of 
intent to sue under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water 
Act (CWA) § 505, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) § 7002. Prior to the expiration of the waiting period, 
EPA commenced a civil enforcement action against Moon Moo 
Farm seeking civil penalties under CWA § 309(d) and injunctive 
relief under CWA § 309(b). At the conclusion of the ninety-day 
waiting period, Riverwatcher intervened in the EPA action 
pursuant to CWA § 505(b)(1)(B) and alleged additional causes of 
5
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action under the RCRA § 7002. Moon Moo Farm answered the 
complaint and asserted a counterclaim against Riverwatcher 
seeking damages and injunctive relief for trespass. Having 
completed discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. 
On April 21, 2014, the district court denied Riverwatcher’s and 
EPA’s motion for summary judgment on their CWA and RCRA 
claims and granted Moon Moo Farm’s motion for summary 
judgment dismissing the CWA and RCRA claims and granting 
judgment on its counterclaim for trespass. EPA and Riverwatcher 
appeal the district court’s decision finding that Moon Moo Farm is 
not a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) subject to 
permitting under the NPDES program, that evidence was 
obtained by trespass and is not admissible in a civil proceeding. 
In addition, Riverwatcher appeals the district court’s holding that 
Moon Moo Farm’s discharges fell within the agricultural 
stormwater exemption of the CWA, the dismissal of the open 
dumping and imminent and substantial endangerment claims 
under RCRA, and the award of damages to Moon Moo Farm for 
trespass. 
II. ISSUES 
The parties have been ordered to brief the following issues on 
appeal: 
  Whether the Queechunk Canal, a man-made body of 
water, is a public trust navigable water of the State of 
New Union, allowing for a private right of navigation 
despite private ownership of the banks on both sides and 
the bottom of the canal by Moon Moo Farm. 
o   On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that 
the Queechunk Canal is a publicly navigable 
waterway. 
o   On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that the 
Queechunk Canal is not a publicly navigable 
waterway. 
   If the canal is not a public trust navigable water, whether 
evidence obtained though trespass and without a 
warrant is admissible in a civil enforcement proceeding 
brought under CWA §§ 309(b), (d) and 505. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2
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o   On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that 
evidence obtained through trespass is admissible. 
o   On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that 
evidence obtained through trespass is not 
admissible 
  Whether Moon Moo Farm requires a permit under the 
CWA NPDES permitting program because Moon Moo 
Farm is a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting by virtue of 
a discharge from its manure land application area. 
o   On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue 
Moon Moo Farm is a CAFO that is subject to 
NPDES permitting. 
o   On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that it is 
not a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting. 
  If Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, whether excess nutrient 
discharges from its manure application fields remove it 
from the agricultural stormwater exemption and 
subject it to NPDES permitting liability. 
o   On appeal, Riverwatcher will argue Moon Moo 
Farm is removed from the agricultural stormwater 
exemption and is subject to NPDES. 
o   On appeal, EPA and Moon Moo Farm will argue 
that application of manure in compliance with a 
nutrient management plan (NMP) exempts it from 
NPDES permitting under the agricultural 
stormwater exemption. 
  Whether Moon Moo Farm is subject to a citizen suit under 
RCRA because its land application of fertilizer and soil 
amendment constitutes a solid waste subject to 
regulation under RCRA Subtitle D. 
o   On appeal, Riverwatcher will argue that the 
landspread mixture constitutes a solid waste and 
Moon Moo Farm is subject to RCRA Subtitle D 
regulation. 
o   On appeal, EPA and Moon Moo Farm will argue 
that the landspread mixture does not constitute a 
solid waste and is not subject to regulation under 
RCRA Subtitle D. 
  If landspread manure and acid whey mixtures constitutes 
a statutory “solid waste” subject to RCRA regulation, 
7
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whether plaintiffs can establish an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to human health subject to 
redress under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). 
o   On appeal, EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that 
an imminent and substantial endangerment has 
been established. 
o   On appeal, Moon Moo Farm will argue that an 
imminent and substantial endangerment has not 
been established. 
III. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: IS THE QUEECHUNK 
CANAL, A MAN-MADE WATER BODY, A PUBLIC 
TRUST NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE STATE OF 
NEW UNION, ALLOWING FOR A PRIVATE RIGHT 
OF NAVIGATION DESPITE PRIVATE 
OWNERSHIP OF THE BANKS ON BOTH SIDES 
AND THE BOTTOM OF THE CANAL BY MOON 
MOO FARM? 
EPA and Riverwatcher contend that the Queechunk Canal 
is a public trust navigable water of the State of New Union.  If 
the canal is a public trust navigable water, it allows for a public 
right of navigation despite Moon Moo Farm’s private ownership of 
the banks and bottom of the canal. Moon Moo Farm contends 
that the Queechunk Canal is not a public trust navigable water of 
the State of New Union that allows for a public right of 
navigation because the banks and bottom are privately owned. 
The public trust doctrine was explicated in Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. 
v Illinois, finding that a state may hold title to the beds of 
navigable waters “in trust for the people of the state that they 
may enjoy the navigation of the water . . .” 146 U.S. 387, 452 
(1892); see also Newcomb v. Cnty. of Carteret, 701 S.E.2d 325, 
336-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).1 Under the public trust doctrine a 
state may subject a riparian owner to rules and regulations for 
the protections of public right to the water. State of Alaska, Dep’t. 
of Natural Res. v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203, 1211 
(Alaska 2010). The Montana Supreme Court found that the public 
 
 1. In addition, it has been found that public waterways are held by the state 
for the use and enjoyment by the public. St. Croix Waterway Ass’n v. Meyer, 178 
F.3d 515, 518-19 (8th Cir. 1999). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2
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owns an “in stream, non-divisionary right” to the use of a state’s 
navigable surface waters for recreational purposes. Mont. Trout 
Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 184-85 (Mont. 
2011). 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that privately 
owned man-made waterways did not become open to all citizens 
just because they connected to other navigable waterways. 
Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979). This case 
looked at navigable water in the context of interstate commerce, 
not taking into account the public trust doctrine of states. As 
cases of navigability cannot all be lumped together one must look 
at the purpose for which navigability was invoked in a particular 
case in order to determine whether to apply the public trust 
doctrine. Id.; see also Vaughn v. Vermillion, 444 U.S. 206, 208 
(1979). Historically, determination of navigability in terms of 
state waterbed title was based on federal law for interstate 
navigable waters, but state public trust doctrines must also be 
taken in account. 
In this case, the resolution of whether Queechunk Canal is a 
navigable water subject to the public trust doctrine will turn on 
whether a man-made canal on privately owned land could be 
considered to be included within the public trust doctrine 
allowing for public right of passage under state law.  One test 
used to determine whether a waterway is navigable in fact under 
federal law asks if the waterway is currently used or is 
susceptible to being used in its ordinary or natural condition as a 
highway for commerce. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 
1215, 1228 (2012).  EPA and Riverwatcher have a persuasive 
argument that the canal is a public trust navigable water based 
on a North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Fish House, Inc. v. 
Clarke, a trespass action revolving around the use of a canal on 
private property. 693 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). Moon 
Moo Farm will rely on Supreme Court cases including Kaiser 
Aetna and Vaughn in its counter arguments. However, it will also 
need to cite state case law in order to avoid the application of 
public trust doctrine. 
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that Queechunk Canal is 
a publicly navigable man-made waterway that is subject to 
private rights of navigation. These parties will draw parallels 
between this case and Fish House, Inc., a trespass action brought 
9
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by one property owner against an adjoining property owner to 
prohibit the use of a canal that divided the two properties. Id. at 
210. In that case, the North Carolina court held that a canal, 
although man-made, was a navigable waterway subject to the 
public trust doctrine. 693 S.E.2d at 211. They will also rely on 
The Daniel Ball for the proposition that all waterways that are 
navigable in fact are navigable in law. 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870); see 
also Gwathmey v. State of North Carolina, 464 S.E.2d. 674, 681-
82 (N.C. 1995) (quoting State of North Carolina v. Baum, 38 S.E. 
900, 901 (N.C. 1901)). Other state court cases will also help EPA 
and Riverwatcher’s argument. For example, one Supreme Court 
of North Carolina case stated that if a body of water can be 
navigated in its natural condition it is navigable in fact even if it 
had not actually been navigated previously. Gwathmey, 464 
S.E.2d at 681-82. South Carolina’s Hughes case also bolsters their 
argument, holding that when a canal is constructed in order to 
connect with navigable waters – as the Queechunk was – it will 
be deemed part of the waters. Hughes v. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d 24, 25 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1990). 
EPA and Riverwatcher will also seek to reframe the legal 
inquiry used to determine navigability, arguing that whether a 
waterway is artificial is not controlling. Id. The question is not 
whether the waterway itself is natural or artificial but rather 
whether the water flows without dwindling or obstruction. State 
of North Carolina v. Twiford, 48 S.E. 586, 587 (N.C. 1904). The 
true test to be applied is whether a waterway is “inherently and 
by its nature” capable of being used for navigation, whether or 
not that is its actual use or the extent of the use. Id.; see also 
State ex. rel Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d. 716, 719 
(S.C. 1986). 
Moon Moo Farm will counter that Queechunk Canal is not 
a publicly navigable man-made waterway subject to private 
rights of navigation due to the fact that the farm privately owns 
the banks and bottom of the canal. It may cite a Louisiana Court 
of Appeals case stating that navigability of a waterway is not 
presumed and that the burden of proof lies with the party 
asserting the navigability (here, EPA and Riverwatcher). Shell 
Oil Co. v. Pitman, 476 So.2d. 1031, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
Although Kaiser Aetna and Vaughn will be helpful to Moon Moo 
Farm’s argument, it must also rely on state cases. For example, 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2
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the Court of Appeals for Louisiana held that a privately owned 
waterway, although navigable in fact, might not be subject to 
public use. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. White, 302 So.2d. 660, 668 (La. 
Ct. App. 1974). As the canal was constructed with private funds 
and on private property, the court was not willing to allow the 
canal title to be “vested in a whole nation” solely because it was 
originally constructed to be deep enough to be navigable and 
allow for flowing water. Id. at 665. The court likened the canal to 
a private road: although used by commercial traffic it may not be 
subject to public use. Id. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, similar in facts to 
this case, is a trespass action brought by private landowners 
against persons using a canal on their property. Additionally, the 
Fifth Circuit has held that waterways made navigable through 
private dredging were not subject to navigational servitude. 
Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (5th 
Cir. 1995). Even if a waterway was navigable, a navigational 
servitude could not be imposed. Id. In addition, a Louisiana 
appellate case held that private canals were not navigable waters 
subject to public use. Buckskin Hunting Club v. Bayard, 868 
So.2d 266, 271-72 (La. Ct. App. 2004). Although their facts are 
not directly on point with the case here, these cases will be 
important to Moon Moo Farm because the Queechunk Canal was 
created on private land. If it is not subject to a navigational 
servitude, then there is no public right of access and 
Riverwatcher agent James was trespassing. 
Moon Moo Farm may also argue that the public trust 
status of a particular water must be determined at the time of a 
State’s admission into the United States under the “Equal 
Footing Doctrine,” citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6 
(1935).  Since the Queechunk Canal had not been constructed at 
the time of New Union’s entry into the Union, imposition of a 
navigational servitude would constitute a taking2 of private 
property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 
 
 2. There is another possible taking claim that Moon Moo Farm could make 
but should not be a main argument. A Florida Supreme Court case held that 
there was no unconstitutional deprivation of an owner’s littoral right without 
just compensation as land seaward of the high water line is subject to the public 
trust doctrine. Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102 
(Fla. 2008). The Walton case looked at waters that are subject to public trust 
doctrine, which cannot be unconstitutionally taken even if no compensation is 
given. 
11
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See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164. EPA and Riverwatcher may 
counter that Oregon applies only to the question of title to lands 
as between the State and the United States, that the question of 
a public trust navigational servitude is a question of State law, 
and that no taking would occur based on consistent application of 
state law public trust principles. Cf. Stop the Beach 
Renourishment v. Florida, 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
IV. EXCLUSIONARY RULE: IF THE CANAL IS NOT A 
PUBLIC TRUST NAVIGABLE WATER, IS 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH TRESPASS 
AND WITHOUT A WARRANT ADMISSIBLE IN A 
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING BROUGHT 
UNDER CWA §§ 309(B), (D) AND 505? 
The exclusionary rule is ordinarily applied in criminal law to 
prevent the introduction of evidence that was illegally obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure right. 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). Moon Moo Farm 
contends that since the Queechunk Canal is not a public trust 
navigable water of the State of New Union, evidence obtained 
through trespass and without a warrant is not admissible in a 
civil proceeding and is subject to the exclusionary rule. EPA and 
Riverwatcher contend that, even if the Queechunk Canal is not 
a public trust navigable water of the State of New Union and 
therefore James was committing a trespass, evidence obtained 
without a warrant is admissible in a civil enforcement proceeding 
and not subject to the exclusionary rule. 
In this case, the district court followed the cases of Trinity 
Indus., Inc. v. OSHRC and Smith Steel Casting Co. v. Brock, 
which stated that even in civil enforcement cases the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule applies. 16 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (6th 
Cir. 1994); 800 F.2d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986). Therefore, it held 
that the evidence obtained by James on April 12, 2013 is not 
admissible. It further stated that EPA should not be allowed to 
violate Fourth Amendment rights just because a third party 
organization obtains the evidence it decides to use. 
EPA and Riverwatcher will point out that, in civil 
litigation, whether illegally obtained evidence is admissible is 
usually left up to the district court as there is not a standard 
exclusionary rule in civil cases. Borges v. Our Lady of the Sea 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/2
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Corp., 935 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir. 1991); Park v. El Paso Bd. of 
Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 1066 (5th Cir 1985); Trans-Cold Exp., 
Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc., 440 F.2d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir. 
1971).3 The Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary 
rule to civil proceedings even though it has applied the rule in 
criminal proceedings. Id. at 447 (1976) (holding IRS was not 
prohibited from using evidence obtained by the LAPD); see also 
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1984) (holding that 
exclusionary rule should not apply in deportation case). These 
parties will rely on the balancing test developed by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Janis and cite instances where the 
exclusionary rule has not been applied in civil cases. 428 U.S. 433 
(1976). For criminal cases, Janis established a balancing test that 
examines whether the deterrent benefit from applying the 
exclusionary rule would outweigh the detriment to the public 
interest. 428 U.S. at 447. For civil cases, Janis established a 
balancing test that weighs the deterrent effect of applying the 
exclusionary rule against the societal costs of excluding the 
evidence in question but also takes into account the integrity of 
the judicial process. Id.; see also Marjorie A. Shields, 
Admissibility, in Civil Proceedings, of Evidence Obtained Through 
Unlawful Search and Seizure, 105 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2003). Using 
Janis’s civil balancing test, EPA and Riverwatcher can show that 
the public interest benefit of uncovering Moon Moo Farm’s 
discharging into the Queechunk Canal outweighs the effect that 
excluding the evidence has on deterring other trespassers. They 
may also point out that the Ninth Circuit stated that the 
inadmissibility of evidence obtained illegally is not applicable 
where it is not a matter of criminal procedure or sanctions 
imposed. N.L.R.B. v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 364 
(9th Cir. 1969). 
Finally, even if this court finds that the exclusionary rule 
should apply, EPA and Riverwatcher may rely on a good faith 
exception to the rule by arguing that James acted in good faith as 
he thought the Queechunk Canal was a publicly navigable water 
body. Using the same cases cited here by the district court, Smith 
Steel Castings Co. determined that the exclusionary rule applies 
 
 3. The case of Trans-Cold Exp., Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc. cites to 
F.R.C.P. 43(a) as a “rule of admissibility, not exclusion.” 
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when penalties are assessed unless the good faith exception can 
be applied. 800 F.2d at 1330 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (evidence obtained by police who acted in 
good faith reliance on a warrant later found to lack probable 
cause was admissible)). These parties can liken James’ actions to 
those of the police officer who believed he possessed a valid 
warrant. 
Moon Moo Farm will counter that since the Queechunk 
Canal is not a public trust navigable water, James was 
trespassing and any evidence obtained by him during that 
trespass should not be admissible in this case. It will rely on the 
cases cited by the district court and liken this case to a criminal 
case where the exclusionary rule applies. Courts have applied the 
exclusionary rule to civil cases that are “quasi-criminal” or 
similar to criminal cases in nature. Christine L. Andreoli, 
Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence in Subsequent Civil 
Proceedings: Focusing on Motive to Determine Deterrence, 51 
Fordham L. Rev. 1019, 1021 (1983). For example, forfeiture 
proceedings have been deemed quasi-criminal in nature and 
therefore the exclusionary rule applies. One 1958 Plymouth 
Sedan, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (evidence obtained during a car 
search without a warrant could not be used in proceeding for 
forfeiture of the car); see also One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. 
Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
Additionally, Moon Moo Farm can point to one of the 
primary purposes of the exclusionary rule – the deterrence of 
future 4th Amendment violations – to bolster its argument for 
application of the exclusionary rule. It might use the balancing 
test from Janis to argue that the deterrent benefit of excluding 
the evidence outweighs the detriment to the public interest. 428 
U.S. at 447. Moon Moo Farm could also point to James’ motive as 
a trespasser and argue for weighing the motive of the person 
collecting the evidence against the deterrent effects of the 
exclusionary rule instead of weighing the benefits to society 
against the deterrent effects. See Tirado v. Comm’r, 689 F.2d 307, 
310 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that the likelihood of deterrence 
requires an assessment of motive and an inquiry into a person’s 
motivation is fundamental in order to translate the idea of 
deterrence into a decision). It might also make an argument for 
excluding the evidence to deter future illegal conduct based on 
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the heightened deterrence effect in an intrasovereign case (which 
we have here) versus an intersovereign case (which Janis was).4 
However, this is not Moon Moo Farm’s strongest argument on 
this issue as it requires them to liken James to an agent of EPA 
and may best be avoided. 
V. CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS: DOES MOON 
MOO FARM NEED A PERMIT UNDER THE CWA 
NPDES PERMITTING PROGRAM? 
A. Is Moon Moo Farm a CAFO subject to NPDES 
permitting by virtue of a discharge from its manure land 
application area? 
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) program under the Clean Water Act (CWA) seeks to 
regulate discharges of a pollutant from a point source into 
navigable waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
EPA and Riverwatcher contend that Moon Moo Farm is a 
concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) subject to NPDES 
permitting because of discharge from its manure land application 
area. Moon Moo Farm contends that the State of New Union 
has deemed it a “no-discharge” animal feeding operation (AFO), 
and that it is not a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting based on 
discharges from its land application area. 
 
 4. Because the exclusionary rule applies in cases where a sovereign entity 
uses evidence obtained by a third party and the sovereign participated in 
obtaining the evidence, Moon Moo Farm might also argue (albeit weakly) that 
James acted in conjunction with and is similar to an agent of EPA and the 
government. In response, EPA and Riverwatcher would argue that James is not 
an agent of either organization. Pike v. Gallagher, 829 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 
(D.N.M. 1993). After likening James to an “agent,” Moon Moo Farm could then 
argue that, because this is an intrasovereign litigation (all occurring within New 
Union), the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence would be more significant 
than it might be in an intersovereign case. See Vander Linden v. United States, 
502 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (holding that the government could not 
use evidence obtained illegally). Applying the exclusionary rule in 
intrasovereign cases would accomplish that purpose because the sovereign 
government can restrain its agents from future 4th Amendment violations. 
Conversely, application in intersovereign cases would not have a deterrent effect 
because one sovereign has no power to restrain another’s agents from future 4th 
Amendment violations. See Id. 
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Generally, an animal agricultural facility needs to first meet 
a definition of an AFO as stated by EPA before it can be classified 
as a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting. All parties agree that 
Moon Moo Farm is considered an AFO as the State of New Union 
designates it as a “no-discharge” AFO. Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2014). If a facility 
meets the definition of an AFO, one must then determine 
whether it meets the definitions of a CAFO and can be regulated 
under the NPDES program. A CAFO can be regulated under the 
NPDES program because CAFOs are point sources as defined by 
the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The parties dispute whether 
Moon Moo Farm is a Medium CAFO subject to NPDES 
permitting. To be a Medium CAFO for a dairy cattle operation, 
the facility must have 200 – 699 cattle, which is not at issue in 
this case as Moon Moo Farm has 350 cattle. § 122.23(b)(6)(i)(A). 
However, the facility must also have a man-made ditch or pipe 
that carries manure or wastewater to area surface waters – a key 
determination for this issue in this case. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii). 
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that Moon Moo Farm is 
a Medium CAFO and should be subject to NPDES permitting as a 
result of discharges from its manure land application area into 
the Queechunk Canal through a man-made drainage ditch on the 
property. An important case for EPA and Riverwatcher is Nat’l 
Pork Producers Council v. E.P.A., which held that EPA had 
authority to impose a duty to apply for a NPDES permit on 
CAFOs that were discharging. 635 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2011). 
The primary purpose of the CWA is to control pollution through 
regulation of discharges into navigable waters. If a CAFO is 
discharging it must therefore have a permit. Id. It would be 
counter to congressional intent to find that requiring a 
discharging CAFO to have a permit is unreasonable under the 
CWA. Id. EPA and Riverwatcher may also rely on language in the 
regulations stating that the appropriate authority5 may designate 
any AFO as a CAFO if it determines that it is a significant 
contributor of pollutants. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(c). There are a 
number of factors that can be considered in determining whether 
to designate an AFO as a CAFO for the purpose of requiring a 
 
 5. Specifically referring to the State Director or Regional Administrator of 
an EPA approved NPDES program. 
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NPDES permit: the size of the operation and amount of waste 
reaching water; the location of the operation relative to water; the 
means of conveyance of animal waste and waste water; other 
factors affecting the likelihood and frequency of discharges into 
water; or any other relevant factor. § 122.23(c)(2)(i)-(v). This 
authority is bolstered by a Washington case where the district 
court was unwilling to use the narrow definition of CAFO just 
because confined animals and fields were not adjacent. Cmty. 
Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 
2d 976 (E.D. Wash. 1999). It ultimately deemed a dairy farm a 
CAFO because it generated significant waste. Id. EPA and 
Riverwatcher can make many factual arguments for regulating 
Moon Mood Farm as a Medium CAFO based on the factors listed 
in 122.23(c)(2)(i)-(v) (e.g., its location at the bend of the river, its 
landspreading operations before rainfall, the pattern of nitrate 
advisories over the past decade, etc.) 
Moon Moo Farm will argue that it does not meet the 
definition of a CAFO as it is not discharging into navigable water 
from its manure land application area through a man-made ditch. 
An important case for Moon Moo Farm will be Waterkeeper 
Alliance, Inc. v. E.P.A., which found that EPA exceeded its 
statutory authority by requiring that CAFOs either apply for a 
NPDES permit or affirmatively demonstrate that there is no 
potential for a discharge now or in the future. 399 F.3d 486, 505 
(2d Cir. 2005). In order for a facility to be deemed a CAFO, a 
discharge must be demonstrated; the discharge cannot be 
assumed. Id. The CWA gives EPA the authority to regulate only 
actual discharges from a point source, not just a potential 
discharge or a point source generally. Id. Therefore, without an 
actual a discharge of a pollutant from the point source there is no 
violation. NRDC v. E.P.A., 859 F.2d 156, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see 
also Service Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 590 F.3d 545, 550 (8th Cir. 2009). 
The 2003 CAFO Rule violated this statutory scheme by imposing 
permitting requirements on all CAFOs regardless of whether 
they have discharged. The Waterkeeper decision required EPA to 
revise the CAFO rule, prompting the release of the 2006 and 2008 
rules. See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (d)-(f). 
Moon Moo Farm may also argue that even if there is a 
drainage ditch that flows from the fields where the manure is 
landspread into the Queechunk Canal, it is still not enough for 
17
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classification as a Medium CAFO. There is no man-made ditch or 
flushing system on the property that carries the manure mixture 
from the production or processing area to the navigable water. 
The runoff that is draining from the fields and through the 
drainage ditch into the Queechunk Canal is precipitation based 
and not purposely discharged into the water. Alt. v. EPA, 979 F. 
Supp. 2d 701, 711 (N.D. W.Va. 2013). Furthermore, production 
and processing areas as well as the animal confinement area are 
separated from the Bermuda grass fields where any direct runoff 
from the AFO would occur. Id. at 714. Moon Moo Farm may also 
cite Nat’l Pork Producers Council for its holding that EPA lacked 
authority to issue regulation stating that CAFOs should be liable 
for failing to apply for a NPDES permit. 635 F.3d at 752 (CWA 
clearly states when EPA can issue compliance orders through § 
309 and does not mention failing to apply for a permit). Finally, it 
may bolster its argument by pointing to a Kentucky case holding 
that CAFOs were not required to have state PDES permits when 
landspreading manure as Moon Moo does here. Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, Energy and Env’t v. Sharp, Nos. 2009-CA-002283-MR, 
2009-CA-002326-MR, 2012 WL 1889307 (May 25, 2012) (hog 
famers not required to obtain KPDES permits even though land 
applying manure). 
B. If Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, do excess nutrient 
discharges from its manure application fields remove it 
from the agricultural stormwater exemption and subject it 
to NPDES permitting liability? 
Riverwatcher contends that Moon Moo Farm is a CAFO 
and therefore subject to NPDES permitting. Riverwatcher further 
contends that, even if Moon Moo Farm does not meet the 
definition of a Medium CAFO, the runoff from the landspreading 
fields constitutes a point source discharge subject to NPDES 
permitting.  There is an agricultural stormwater exemption to the 
NPDES requirement that allows for a precipitation related 
discharge. EPA and Moon Moo Farm contend that, because 
Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, the farm’s land application of 
manure in accordance with a nutrient management plan (NMP) 
is exempt from NPDES permitting under the agricultural 
stormwater exemption. 
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EPA’s land application rule states that, generally, discharges 
of manure into waters of the United States from a CAFO due to 
the application of manure to facility owned areas of land is a 
discharge subject to NPDES permitting. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e). 
The exception to this is the agricultural stormwater discharge 
exemption, which allows manure application in accordance with 
an NMP and precipitation related discharges to occur without the 
facility becoming subject to NPDES permitting. Id. An 
agricultural stormwater discharge or return flow from an 
irrigated agriculture exemption to a point source is specifically 
carved out of the definition under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
When manure is spread in accordance with a site specific NMP 
that “ensure[s] appropriate agricultural utilization of the 
nutrients in the manure,” any precipitation related discharge 
from the land area is considered an exempt agricultural 
stormwater discharge. § 122.23(e)(1). The NMP must identify site 
specific appropriate buffers or equivalent practices to control 
runoff of pollutants and establish land application protocols for 
manure that ensure appropriate agricultural utilization of the 
nutrients. § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix). 
The district court followed the ruling in Alt v. EPA, which 
held that runoff of litter and manure from a field outside the 
animal production area did not constitute a CAFO discharge and 
was instead agricultural stormwater discharge exempt from 
NPDES permitting requirements. 979 F. Supp. 2d at 711. 
Riverwatcher argues that, even if Moon Moo Farm is not a 
CAFO, its excess application of wastes to its fields using manure 
spreaders, which are discrete and confined conveyances, 
constitutes a point source discharge requiring a NPDES permit. A 
case that will be particularly important for this argument is 
Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, which 
found that manure spreading vehicles were point sources. 34 F.3d 
114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit therefore held that 
the dairy operation could not avail itself of the agricultural 
stormwater exemption even though crops were grown in an area 
outside where animals were kept. Id.; see also Cmty. Ass’n for 
Restoration of Env’t v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 981 
(instruments used to apply animal waste will be considered point 
sources themselves). Additional cases have found that manure 
spreading vehicles and fields or ditches used to store or transfer 
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waste are included in defining a CAFO as a point source in order 
to serve the purposes of the CWA. See United States v. Weisman, 
489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s 
League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 532 (W.D. La. 1979).6 
Relying on Sid Koopman Dairy, Riverwatcher will also 
argue that Moon Moo Farm’s land application is not in best 
practices and its NMP cannot shield it from permitting liability 
through the agricultural stormwater exemption. 54 F. Supp. 2d at 
981 (stating that a CAFO cannot avoid responsibility for over 
application or misapplication of waste to fields through the 
agricultural stormwater exemption). It will also show that the 
Ninth Circuit has found that a facility that over applies – and 
therefore misapplies – manure wastewater to its field is subject to 
NPDES permitting. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. 
Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on 
testimony of residents who had seen manure wastewater applied 
to the fields located on the property and then spillage occurring 
into a nearby canal). 
Finally, Riverwatcher will also argue that Moon Moo Farm 
cannot claim the agricultural stormwater discharge exemption 
because its use of the mixture of manure and acid whey was 
really waste disposal rather than application of fertilizer. See 
infra Riverwatcher argument at 19-20. It will point out that Moon 
Moo Farm’s NMP was procedurally defective since there was no 
review of the NMP by the public or the New Union Department of 
Agriculture (DOA). Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 498. 
The final 2008 EPA CAFO rule requires that when an NMP is 
submitted for the purpose of NPDES permitting requirements, 
permitting authorities must conduct a review of the NMP and 
provide for public review and comment. Revised National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations in Response to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 70,418 (November 20, 2008). Making the determination that 
Moon Moo Farm is a “no discharge” AFO not subject to NPDES 
permitting without review would be arbitrary and capricious. 
 
 6. The case of Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc. speaks to the 
possibility that if normally unchanneled surface waters or rainfall runoff is 
purposely channeled in connection with business activities it can be considered 
point source pollution. 620 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 498. Furthermore, Moon 
Moo Farm did not comply with the NMP since the acid whey 
interfered with the nutrient uptake assumptions outlined.7 
In response, EPA and Moon Moo Farm will argue that, if 
Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, application of manure in 
compliance with an NMP exempts it from NPDES permitting 
liability through the agricultural stormwater exemption. EPA 
and Moon Moo Farm, like the district court, will rely on Alt v. 
EPA, which stated runoff caused by precipitation fell within 
agricultural stormwater exemption and was not subject to 
NPDES permitting. 979 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12. The CWA 
specifically exempts agricultural stormwater discharges from its 
NPDES permitting requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
Regulations expand on the agricultural stormwater exemption to 
state that when manure has been applied in accordance with a 
site specific NMP that ensures proper utilization of the nutrients, 
any precipitation related discharge is an agricultural stormwater 
discharge within the exemption. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e). 
Agricultural stormwater discharges occur when precipitation 
comes in contact with the land area and causes runoff into 
navigable waters. Fisherman Against Destruction of Env’t v. 
Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (held 
discharge of rainwater was agricultural stormwater discharge); 
see Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121. EPA’s 2003 CAFO rule 
expanded the exemptions under the agricultural stormwater 
exemption to include discharges from land application if it was 
according to a site specific NMP. Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 
635 F.3d. at 744. Moon Moo Farm is currently a “no-discharge” 
AFO but has also submitted an NMP that sets forth manure 
application rates along with expected uptake of nutrients by the 
crops grown. They will argue that in the case of a “no-discharge” 
AFO without a NPDES permit, there is no requirement that an 
NMP go through public review and comments to be effective. 73 
Fed. Reg. at 70,418. A facility operator must certify that there is 
 
 7. Some states have specific Nutrient Management Acts, which pertain to 
agricultural facilities and require that the operator of a CAFO shall develop and 
implement an NMP that must be submitted for review. See 3 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 506(b) (West 2014); see also Syngaro –WWT, Inc. v. Rush Tp., Pa., 299 F. 
Supp. 2d 410, 417 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Douma, 193 P.3d 
1102, 1107 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
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no current discharge and no potential for discharge, taking into 
account practices and procedures of the NMP. Id. As Moon Moo 
Farm is deemed by the State of New Union DOA to be a “no-
discharge” AFO, there is no need to apply for a NPDES permit, as 
there must be an actual discharge into navigable water to trigger 
the permit requirement. Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d 
at 750. 
VI. RCRA VIOLATIONS: IS MOON MOO FARM 
SUBJECT TO A CITIZEN SUIT UNDER THE 
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY 
ACT? 
A. When applied to the soil as fertilizer and soil 
amendment, does a mixture of manure and acid whey 
from a yogurt processing facility constitute a solid waste 
subject to regulation under RCRA Subtitle D?  
Riverwatcher contends, in the alternative to its CWA 
claims, see infra note 8, that the landspread mixture of manure 
and acid whey from Moon Moo Farm constitutes a solid waste 
and is subject to regulation under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) Subchapter IV open dumping provision. 
The purpose of RCRA is to establish federal guidelines for the 
management and disposal of solid waste from both industrial and 
non-industrial sources and to prohibit the open dumping of solid 
waste. EPA and Moon Moo Farm contend that the landspread 
mixture of manure and acid whey does not constitute a solid 
waste under RCRA and is therefore not subject to regulation 
under Subtitle D. 
The policy and purpose behind RCRA was to reduce or 
eliminate the generation of solid waste and ensure that any solid 
waste that is generated is treated and disposed of in way that 
minimizes the threat to human health and the environment. 42 
U.S.C. § 6902(b). Under RCRA, a solid waste is considered to be 
any discarded material that is a solid, liquid or semisolid material 
that results from an industrial, commercial, or agricultural 
operation. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). This does not include solid waste 
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from industrial discharges as point source that are subject to 
permitting under the NPDES program of the CWA.8 Id. Also 
under RCRA Subchapter IV, any solid waste management 
practice or disposal considered to be open dumping is prohibited. 
42 U.S.C. § 6945(a). RCRA further defines open dumping to 
include any facility where solid waste is disposed of that is not 
considered a sanitary landfill. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(14). However, 
EPA regulations specifically exclude land application of 
agricultural waste used for fertilizer or soil conditioner from the 
open dumping provision. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1). 
Is the landspread mixture a solid waste? 
The court must first determine whether the manure and acid 
whey mixture that Moon Moo Farm applies to its Bermuda grass 
fields constitutes a solid waste. Both sides will look at whether 
the landspread mixture was discarded under the definition of 
solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i)(A)-(D).  Riverwatcher will 
argue that the mixture is actually being discarded by Chokos and 
falls under the regulation of RCRA. It will rely on the Ninth 
Circuit cases of Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer and Ecological 
Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. to argue that the mixture 
falls within the definition of solid waste. 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 
2004); 713 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2013). EPA and Moon Moo Farm 
will argue that the landspread mixture is not discarded and 
therefore does not fall under the definition of solid waste. EPA 
and Moon Moo Farm will rely on the congressional intent of 
RCRA and current regulations under RCRA that exempt certain 
agricultural waste. They will also point to the benefits of the 
landspreading application to show that it is not a waste. See 
Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-0329-GKF-PJC, 2010 
WL 653032 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 17, 2010); Safe Food & Fertilizer v. 
EPA, 350 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
Riverwatcher’s argument that the landspread mixture 
constitutes a solid waste turns on whether it can show that Moon 
 
 8. Therefore, Riverwatcher can only bring this RCRA claim if Moon Moo 
Farm is found not to be a CAFO subject to NPDES permitting or its discharges 
are exempt from NPDES permitting under the agricultural stormwater 
exemption. Accordingly, this issue will be argued in the alternative to the CAFO 
issue. 
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Moo Farm contributes to the “handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation or disposal” of any solid waste. 42 U.S.C § 
6972(a)(1)(B). The Ninth Circuit adopted the ordinary, plain 
meaning of discarded: “to cast aside, reject, abandon, or give up.” 
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1041; see also 
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d at 515; 
Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t, Inc. v. George & Margaret 
LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156 (E.D. Wash. 2013). In Safe Air, 
the Ninth Circuit also laid out three approaches to help determine 
whether a material qualifies as a discarded solid waste. 373 F.3d 
at 1043. 
     Whether the material is destined for a beneficial use 
through a continuous process by the generating industry. 
Id. (citing Am. Mining Congress v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 
1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
     Whether the material is being actively reused, or whether 
there is only potential for reuse. Id. (citing Am. Mining 
Congress v. U.S. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 
1990)). 
     Whether its original owner is using the material. Id. (citing 
United States v. ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir. 
1993)). 
Riverwatcher will contend that, although the manure and 
acid whey mixture is being actively reused, it is not being put to 
beneficial use nor is its original owner, Chokos Greek Yogurt, 
using it. Instead, Moon Moo Farm is adding the acid whey from 
the Chokos plant to its manure and landspreading the mixture in 
an effort to get rid of it on behalf of Chokos. 
Riverwatcher may also point to several other definitions of 
discarded. For example, the Second Circuit has found a product to 
be a discarded waste when it has served its intended purpose and 
is no longer wanted. No Spray Coal, Inc. v. N.Y.C., 252 F.3d 148, 
150 (2d Cir. 2001). A mixture could also be found to be a 
discarded solid waste if it is applied beyond what was necessary 
to serve as fertilizer and therefore no longer serves its intended 
purpose. George & Margaret LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-58. 
Riverwatcher will argue that the addition of the acid whey to the 
manure has no real intended purpose or benefit and is no longer 
wanted by Chokos or Moon Moo Farm when it is applied to the 
Bermuda grass fields. 
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EPA and Moon Moo Farm will counter that the mixture of 
manure and acid whey is not considered a solid waste and 
therefore is not subject to regulation under RCRA. Congressional 
intent was that agricultural waste returned to the soil for use as 
fertilizer and conditioner is not to be considered discarded 
material under RCRA. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491(I), at 2 (1976). A 
major objective of RCRA is to increase the reclamation and reuse 
practices of agriculture, reducing the volume of the discarded 
material disposal problem under RCRA. Id.; see also Safe Air for 
Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1045 (holding that grass residue was not 
solid waste). EPA and Moon Moo Farm will assert that the land 
application of the manure and acid whey mixture is of beneficial 
use to the fields and therefore cannot be considered discarded 
material under the definition of solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 
261.2(a)(2)(i)(A)-(D). When the mixture is applied for a normal, 
beneficial and intended use, even if it is not fully utilized as such, 
it is not considered a solid waste subject to regulation under 
RCRA. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 WL 653032, at *10-11. Application 
of the agricultural waste mixtures to fields is a normal use for the 
product and it was the intended use of Moon Moo Farm. In 
determining whether the mixture has a beneficial use, courts 
have considered whether it has market value or is being put to 
good use. Safe Food and Fertilizer v. E.P.A., 350 F.3d at 1269. 
Moon Moo Farm will state that, although the mixture may not 
necessarily have a market value outside its property, it is being 
put to good use in the fields as it enhances the growth of the 
Bermuda grass that is dried and harvested as silage during the 
summer. 
Is the application of the landspread mixture 
considered open dumping? 
Next, the court must determine whether Moon Moo Farm’s 
application of the landspread mixture to its Bermuda grass fields 
is considered open dumping under RCRA. This issue turns on 
whether Moon Moo Farm uses its manure and acid whey mixture 
as a fertilizer or soil conditioner and therefore falls under the 
exemption for agricultural waste. The district court in this case 
relied on a specific exemption in the solid waste disposal 
regulations for agricultural waste, including manure, which is 
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returned to the soil for fertilizer or conditioner. 40 C.F.R. § 
257.1(c)(1). 
Riverwatcher will argue that Moon Moo Farm is not using 
the landspread mixture as a fertilizer or soil conditioner because 
the addition of the acid whey to the mixture is not for the benefit 
of the soil. Rather, the addition of the acid whey to the mixture is 
a method of waste disposal on behalf of Chokos. This violates the 
RCRA open dumping provision and does not fall under the 
exemption of agricultural waste used for fertilizer or soil 
conditioner. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1). 
Riverwatcher will also argue that the application of the 
landspread mixture violates certain EPA guidelines prohibiting 
practices of solid waste disposal (including open dumping onto 
fields in certain situations) that have a reasonable probability of 
adverse effects.  40 C.F.R § 257.3. It will argue that there is a 
reasonable probability of adverse effects here as the landspread 
mixture discharges to the canal and contributes to the nitrate 
advisories. First, Riverwatcher will assert that Moon Moo Farm 
is located in a floodplain due to its proximity to the Deep Quod 
River and that the application of the mixture results in a washout 
of solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-1. Riverwatcher will point out 
that the mixture is applied to an area used for the production of 
food-chain crops that is not at a pH level above 6.5. 40 C.F.R § 
257.3-5. This claim is based on the testimony of Dr. Ella Mae, 
who stated that the addition of the acid whey to the manure 
mixture increased the acidity of the mixture and lowered the pH 
of the soil to 6.1 when applied to the Bermuda grass fields. The 
lowered pH level then prevents the soil from properly absorbing 
the nutrients in the mixture. Finally, Riverwatcher will assert 
that the application of the manure and acid whey mixture is done 
in such a way that may contaminate groundwater and 
underground drinking water. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4. According to 
Dr. Mae, since the soil was prevented from properly absorbing the 
nutrients from the mixture, the nutrients not absorbed by the soil 
then leach into the groundwater. 
EPA and Moon Moo Farm will counter that the land 
application of the manure and acid whey mixture is exempt from 
the open dumping provision because it falls within the 
agricultural waste exemption. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1). Moon Moo 
Farm uses the mixture as a fertilizer and soil conditioner for its 
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Bermuda grass fields. The addition of the acid whey is not just 
performed as a means of disposal. They will assert that there is 
insufficient evidence to show that addition of the acid whey to the 
manure is not done for fertilizing or soil conditioning purposes. 
Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Del. Ostego Corp., 450 F. Supp. 
2d at 487.  There must be sufficient evidence for Riverwatcher to 
substantiate specific claims under the regulations for open 
dumping. Id. They will point to the testimony of Moon Moo 
Farm’s expert, Dr. Emmet Green, who did not dispute the fact 
that the acid whey reduced the pH level of the soil and the 
nutrient uptake. However, he stated that the addition of whey to 
manure to be used as soil conditioner is a recognized agricultural 
practice of the State of New Union. Dr. Green also testified that 
although the pH level of the soil is reduced, Bermuda grass has a 
wide range of acceptable pH levels that still allow for the 
absorption of nutrients. The reduction in the pH level would 
therefore not violate 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-5. Additionally, they will 
argue that Riverwatcher has not provided enough evidence to 
assert that the application of the landspread mixture 
contaminated ground water and contributed to the recent nitrate 
advisories in the State of New Union. 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4. 
Without sufficient evidence, the claims that Moon Moo Farm has 
violated the open dumping provision cannot stand. Dague v. City 
of Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 467 (D. Vt. 1989). 
B.  Do Moon Moo Farm’s landspreading practices present 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to human 
health or the environment subject to citizen suit redress 
under RCRA? 
Under RCRA, a citizen suit action is permitted against any 
person who contributes to a situation that may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the 
environment. EPA and Riverwatcher contend that 
Riverwatcher has established an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to human health claim for Moon Moo Farm’s 
application of the landspread mixture. Moon Moo Farm 
contends that Riverwatcher has not established sufficient 
evidence to bring an imminent and substantial endangerment 
claim. 
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Under § 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA, a citizen suit civil action can 
be brought against any person, including any past or present 
owner or operator of a facility, who is contributing or has in the 
past contributed to the disposal of a solid waste which may 
present and imminent and substantial endangerment to health or 
the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). After establishing 
that the landspread mixture is a solid waste, Riverwatcher will 
need to establish three elements in order to bring such a RCRA 
claim against Moon Moo Farm: 
     the application of the landspread mixture may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of 
residents in the area around Moon Moo Farm; 
     the potential endangerment stems from past or present 
disposal of the manure and acid whey mixture; and 
     Moon Moo Farm is currently contributing or has 
contributed in the past to the disposal of the manure and 
acid whey mixture through landspreading. 
Here, the district court dismissed Riverwatcher’s RCRA 
claim because the manure and acid whey mixture do not 
constitute a solid waste as defined by RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 
6903(27). (However, EPA and Riverwatcher can point to Conn. 
Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms, in which the 
Second Circuit held that a material could still be a statutory solid 
waste for a § 7002(a)(1)(B) imminent and substantial 
endangerment action even though it was excluded from an EPA 
regulatory program. 989 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (2d Cir. 1993).) The 
district court went on to hold that, even if the mixture was 
considered to be a solid waste, Riverwatcher did not present 
sufficient evidence to bring a claim under § 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA 
for imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or 
the environment. This determination was based on testimony 
provided by Riverwatcher’s expert regarding the lack of a clear 
causal link to the nitrate advisories in Farmville. In addition, the 
nitrate levels posed no health risks to adults and juveniles, except 
infants who were given bottled water and not harmed. The 
district court cited the case of Davies v. Nat’l Co-op Refinery Ass’n 
for the principle that, in order to be a health risk, exposure to the 
risk would need to be present. 963 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 
1997). Since, due to the nitrate advisory, no one was exposed to 
the elevated nitrate levels, there could not be a risk of imminent 
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and substantial endangerment to human health from Moon Moo 
Farm’s landspreading activities. 
Thus, the resolution of this RCRA citizen suit issue will turn 
on whether Riverwatcher has sufficient evidence that Moon Moo 
Farm is contributing or has contributed to the disposal of a solid 
waste which may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the health of the people of Farmville. EPA and 
Riverwatcher will argue that Moon Moo Farm’s application of 
the landspread mixture, which is a solid waste under RCRA, 
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
health of the people of Farmville as evidenced by the multiple 
nitrate advisories. They will rely on Dague v. City of Burlington 
as well as U.S. v. Conservation Chem. Co. to establish the level of 
endangerment needed. 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991); 619 F. Supp. 
162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). They will also rely on two Missouri cases to 
help define the terms imminent and substantial as well as the 
standard for being a contributor to the endangerment. In 
response, Moon Moo Farm will rely on Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc. 
and Price v. United States Navy to show that the danger here was 
neither imminent nor substantial. 516 U.S. 479 (1996); 39 F.3d 
1011 (9th Cir. 1994). Moon Moo Farm will also argue that there is 
no causal link between its activities and the elevated nitrate 
levels in the river, and so it cannot be held liable as a contributor. 
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that there is sufficient 
evidence to establish that Moon Moo Farm’s application of the 
manure and acid whey mixture to its Bermuda grass fields 
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment actionable 
under RCRA § 7002. To establish a claim of endangerment, they 
need only demonstrate a significant risk of harm, not actual 
harm. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Endangerment may be declared 
at any point in the chain of events that may produce harm to the 
public; it does not have to be at the exact point the harm 
occurred. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. E.P.A., 465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972). Riverwatcher claims that the elevated nitrate levels in 
Farmville’s water supply (as evidenced by the nitrate advisories) 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health 
of the people of Farmville. To show that the harm is imminent, 
Riverwatcher does not need to prove that the harm will occur 
tomorrow, just that threat of harm exists now. United States v. 
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 194. Imminence is 
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satisfied if the factors leading to harm are present, even if the 
harm itself does not occur until years in the future. Id. 
Imminence refers to the nature of the threat rather than the time 
frame. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Courts have been reluctant to 
narrowly define the term substantial. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun 
Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2009). To show that the 
endangerment is substantial, Riverwatcher must show that the 
facts imply a serious harm. Id. Courts have considered an 
endangerment to be substantial when there is reasonable cause 
for concern of harm. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 194. 
EPA and Riverwatcher will argue that the numerous nitrate 
advisories issued in Farmville suggest that there is a potential 
and recurring serious harm that exist now and might endanger 
the public in the future. 
To hold Moon Moo Farm liable for disposal of the solid waste, 
EPA and Riverwatcher must also argue that Moon Moo Farm’s 
landspreading of the manure and acid whey mixture is a 
contributing factor to the threat of endangerment. United States 
v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987); 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(B) (a citizen suit claim can be brought against anyone 
who has contributed or is contributing). Although, the definition 
of contribute is not explicitly stated within RCRA, the nature of 
RCRA and the citizen suit provision suggests a liberal 
construction that errs on the side of protecting human health and 
the environment. Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 
81, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). Importantly, the plain meaning of 
contribute is to “have a share in” or in other instances “help to 
cause.” Id. at 111-12; see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. 
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1384 (8th Cir. 1989); Zands v. Nelson, 779 
F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (S.D. Cal. 1991). Therefore, EPA and 
Riverwatcher will argue that even if Moon Moo Farm is not the 
sole cause of the nitrate advisories and subsequent endangerment 
to Farmville, it can still be held liable as a contributor because it 
has helped to cause the elevated nitrate levels in the river. 
Moon Moo Farm will respond that Riverwatcher has not 
established sufficient evidence to bring an imminent and 
substantial endangerment claim against it for its application of 
the landspread mixture to the Bermuda grass fields. The 
Supreme Court has stated that endangerment can only be 
considered imminent if the harm threatens to occur immediately. 
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Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. at 485-86. This excludes waste 
that no longer presents a danger. Id. In addition, a threat must 
be present now even if the actual harm or impact is not apparent 
until later in time. Price, 39 F.3d at 1019. Endangerment is 
substantial if it is serious and indicates a necessity for action. Id. 
Moon Moo Farm will argue that the harm in this case is not 
imminent because it is not currently present. The last nitrate 
advisory was issued over a year ago. In addition, as the district 
court stated, there is no serious harm when the nitrate advisories 
for water are only issued with regard to infants who were not 
harmed because they drank bottled water. 
Moon Moo Farm will also argue that it cannot be a 
contributor as defined by the statute because one must act as a 
determining factor in order to contribute. Murtaugh v. New York, 
810 F. Supp. 2d 446, 474 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Interfaith 
Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 796, 844 
(D.N.J. 2003). There must be more than just mere ownership of a 
property; a level of causation must exist between the actions of 
the owner and the alleged endangerment. Delaney v. Town of 
Carmel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 237, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Thus, the 
necessary interpretation of a person who has contributed or is 
contributing was only intended to impose liability on those shown 
to have affirmatively acted as a determining, causal factor in the 
endangerment. Id. Relying on Riverwatcher’s expert testimony 
that it was impossible to state that Moon Moo Farm was the “but 
for” cause of the 2013 nitrate advisory, Moon Moo Farm will 
argue that the necessary causal link between the landspreading 
and the nitrate advisories cannot be made. 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the 
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be 
addressed by teams. One should appreciate reasoned and 
reasonable creativity and ideas beyond those in this 
limited analysis. 
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VII. SAMPLE JUDGES QUESTIONS 
These questions are suggested as a starting point. Please feel 
free to develop your own questions. 
Issue 1: Public Trust Doctrine 
 EPA and Riverwatcher 
o   The Queechunk Canal is a man-made body of 
water located on private land. What makes it 
subject to the public trust doctrine? 
o   Wouldn’t subjecting the Queechunk Canal to the 
public trust doctrine weaken the integrity of 
private property rights? 
o   If a waterway is made navigable at the hands of a 
private party, why should it automatically be 
subject to public use? 
 Moon Moo Farm 
o   Isn’t the purpose of the public trust doctrine to 
safeguard navigable waters for use in commerce or 
the enjoyment of the public? 
o   If the canal was constructed to be deep enough for 
a small boat to navigate it and connects at both 
ends to a navigable waterway, shouldn’t it be 
subject to public use? 
o   Why should a natural waterway and a man-made 
waterway be treated differently in relation to the 
public trust doctrine? 
Issue 2: Exclusionary Rule 
 EPA and Riverwatcher 
o   If this court determines that James was 
trespassing at the time he collected the evidence, 
why should we admit that evidence? 
o   Wouldn’t admitting the evidence collected by 
James be a violation of Moon Moo Farm’s Fourth 
Amendment rights? 
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o   Does the deterrent effect of discouraging trespass 
to obtain evidence outweigh the public benefit of 
knowing of Moon Moo Farm activity? 
 Moon Moo Farm 
o   Why should this court apply the exclusionary rule 
when historically it is applied to criminal cases 
and not civil cases? 
o   How is James an agent of Riverwatcher or of EPA? 
o   How does the deterrent effect of discouraging 
trespass by private citizens outweigh the public 
benefit of knowing of Moon Moo Farm’s 
discharging into the Queechunk Canal? 
Issue 3: CAFO 
 EPA and Riverwatcher 
o   Does Moon Moo Farm have an actual discharge 
from its production area or manure collection 
facilities? 
o   Don’t the regulations prevent classification of Moon 
Moo Farm as a CAFO as long as there is no 
discharge from the production area and manure 
lagoon? 
o   Why should this court consider evidence of a 
discharge from Moon Moo Farm that was obtained 
illegally, since this is the only evidence EPA and 
Riverwatcher have of a discharge? 
 Moon Moo Farm 
o   If Moon Moo Farm fits into the requirements of a 
Medium CAFO and is discharging manure from its 
lagoon via its landspreading operations, shouldn’t 
it be required to obtain a NPDES permit? 
o   If Moon Moo Farm is contributing to pollution of 
the Queechunk Canal, doesn’t the government 
have a responsibility to regulate it? 
o   Regardless of how the evidence was collected, 
doesn’t this court have an obligation to consider it 
in matters of upholding the CWA? 
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Issue 4: Agricultural Stormwater Exemption 
 Riverwatcher 
o   Wouldn’t determining that the landspreadng 
vehicles are point sources undermine EPA’s 
regulation regarding discharging CAFOs? 
o   What criteria should this court use in determining 
what is best management practices for procedures 
carried out according to an NMP? 
o   Does the regulation specifically state that public 
review and comment must be completed for the 
State of New Union to classify Moon Moo Farm as 
a “no-discharge” AFO? 
 EPA and Moon Moo Farm 
o   If Moon Moo Farm is discharging excess nutrients, 
shouldn’t it be regulated, regardless of whether it 
has an NMP? 
o   If Moon Moo Farm is not landspreading in 
accordance with its NMP, wouldn’t that remove it 
from protection under the agricultural stormwater 
exemption? 
o   How is landspreading beneficial if it is being over 
applied or misapplied? 
Issue 5: Solid Waste under RCRA Subtitle D 
 Riverwatcher 
o   Why would this court not follow the legislative 
intent of RCRA drafters, which states that 
agricultural waste being used as soil fertilizers or 
conditioners is exempt from regulation? 
o   How does a manure and acid whey mixture that is 
purposefully being applied to Moon Moo Farm’s 
fields fit into being “discarded” under the 
definition of solid waste? 
o   Doesn’t the manure and acid whey mixture have a 
beneficial use to the fields of Bermuda grass? 
 
 
 EPA and Moon Moo Farm 
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o   The general definition of solid waste includes any 
solid, liquid or semisolid resulting from an 
agricultural operation that is not subject to 
NPDES permitting. Why would this not apply to 
Moon Moo Farm’s manure and acid whey mixture? 
o   How is the land application of the manure and acid 
whey mixture not considered discarded, 
abandoned or recycled? 
o   Does the addition of acid whey to the manure 
mixture have a beneficial use as a fertilizer or soil 
conditioner for the Bermuda grass? 
Issue 6: Imminent and Substantial Endangerment 
 EPA and Riverwatcher 
o   If there is no harm done to the people of Farmville, 
how can there be an imminent a substantial 
endangerment? 
o   What evidence suggests that there is an 
endangerment present now? 
o   Is Moon Moo Farm a “but for” cause of the nitrate 
advisory? If not, how can they be held liable? 
 Moon Moo Farm 
o   Doesn’t the issuance of nitrate advisories suggest 
that there is the possible presence of harm? 
o   Even if Moon Moo Farm is not the “but for” cause 
of the advisories, aren’t they still liable as a 
contributor? 
o   Shouldn’t this court interpret the language of 
RCRA liberally to ensure the best remedy for the 
people of Farmville? 
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